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U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
Subcommittee on Human Resource
September 13, 1984

My name is Wayne Wendling. I am a Senior Economist with the W. E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research in Kalamazoo, Michigan. The Upjohn Institute
is an endowed, nonprofit organization that has been conducting research in the
broad areas of employment and unemployment since 1945.
My comments on Reductions-in-Force (RIFs) and H.R. 6080 will be directed
primarily to the role of collective bargaining. In so doing, I will rely on
experiences and practices in the private sector. My discussion of private
sector initiatives is based on my book, The Plant Closure Policy Dilemma:
Labor, Law and Bargaining.!
I.

AN OVERVIEW

The private sector equivalent of RIFs, plant closures or large scale
permanent layoffs, is a very difficult problem for which to devise an
acceptable solution. Perhaps the root of the difficulty is complex
philosophical questions it raises.
* Should the rights of owners of physical capital automatically take
precedence over the rights of owners of human capital?
* Although the mobility of workers and physical capital are both
considered to enhance efficiency, is it equitable to place restrictions
on the latter and not the former?
* Are companies and workers equally positioned to respond to economic
change? If unequally positioned, should a greater social obligation be
placed on the one best positioned to respond?
* If government policies and actions increase the probability of closing a
plant, can or should government policy be neutral towards the effects of
closures?
*The statements of facts and the views expressed in this testimony are the sole
responsibility of the author. The viewpoints do not necessarily represent
positions of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.

The resolution of the plant closure policy dilemma would be relatively
straightforward if we could agree on the answers to these philosophical
questions. But such agreement is unlikely because although we value individual
freedom, profit maximization and equity, we have not agreed on the terms of
trade among these three.
The dilemma facing the United States House of Representatives and the Civil
Service system as RIFs are considered also is difficult and raises several of
the complex philosophical questions listed above. But RIFs in the federal
government do not involve the serious complication present in the private
sector. Specifically, the United States Government, as an employer, does not
need to worry that its actions will place it at a competitive disadvantage.
Private firms may have the perception that implementing a positive program
to mitigate the negative impacts of closure will increase their costs and place
them at a serious competitive disadvantage. Attempts by states to adopt
legislation also are stalled due to fears of becoming "notorious" -- of holding
industry hostage -- and being pegged as having a negative business climate.
Therefore, search for a general solution in the private sector faces
several serious and binding constraints. First, action by individual states
simply will exacerbate the economic development war between the states. Some
states have acted, but there are strong incentives not to do anything. Second,
although individual companies have established exemplary programs to mitigate
the problems associated with plant closure, general adoption of such programs
are not likely. Plant closure frequently is the result of financial problems
brought on by competitive pressures. Positive closure programs may not be
financially possible and/or will put a firm at even more of a competitive
disadvantage. Finally, solutions must be consistent with the "managerial,
institutional and political factors that determine the effectiveness of
policies in practice".2 We are a nation that values individual freedom and
profit maximization. Programs to mitigate the plant closure dilemma must
attempt to keep these values in mind.
II.

PRIVATE SECTOR EXEMPLARY PROGRAMS AND STATE INITIATIVES

Brown & Williamson's handling of its tobacco facility closure in
Louisville, Kentucky is considered a model closure.3 It should be noted that
Brown & Williamson was required to provide 18 months advance notice by the
terms of its collective bargaining contract and the resulting program was
achieved through collective bargaining. The key facets were as follows:
* A graduated severance pay program for both hourly and salaried
employees.
* An early retirement option for workers whose age and experience equalled
or exceeded 70.
* Continued life and medical insurance coverage for up to six months after
leaving the company.
* Retraining programs for those remaining in the Louisville area.
* Group counseling for those displaced.
* A job placement program run by Brown & Williamson through which
contracts were made with other employees.

Other exemplary programs in the private sector have been developed by the
Dana Corporation, Empire-Detroit Steel, Ford Motor Company, Goodyear's Lee Tire
Division and International Silver.4 These programs tended to have the
following common features:
*
*
*
*
*
*

Consultation regarding the closure
Advance notice
Counseling and motivation sessions
Retraining
Employer involvement in finding new employment
Extension of health insurance benefits

The states have attempted two major types of plant closure policy
initiatives. The first has been to prescribe the behavior of firms intending
to close. Advance notice, continued wage payments, and severance payments to
workers and communities are elements of this type of initiative. In some
respects, the purpose of these requirements has been to make closure so onerous
that firms would not carry through the threat. The second type has been to
develop assistance programs for those workers displaced including job clubs,
retraining, job search skills and relocation assistance. This approach has
been adopted more frequently by individual states since the more prescriptive
types of governmental action may place a state at a competitive disadvantage
vis-a-vis other states.
An interesting example of this move away from prescription is the change in
the Wisconsin state law.5 In 1975 the Wisconsin legislature adopted a 60-day
advance notice requirement in cases of plant closure. That requirement has
since been repealed and replaced by voluntary guidelines combined with
incentives in the form of positive adjustment assistance.
Massachusetts, 1984 legislation is a blend of the two types of
initiatives. It incorporates the following provisions:
* reemployment assistance
* supplemental unemployment benefits must be paid for 13 weeks when
advance notice of severance pay are not provided.
* economic stabilization fund to offer reduced interest rate funds for
plant modernization
* a social compact expecting 90 days advance notice to workers prior to
shutdown.
III. THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING STRATEGY

The policy question surrounding plant closure is: How can a policy be
constructed that is minimally disruptive, yet it is effective at correcting the
problem?
The plant closure problem must be placed in perspective. What is its
magnitude? Since no governmental agency is charged with recording the closing
of a plant or counting the number of workers directly affected, its exact
magnitude is unknown. Two independent sources, a survey of Fortune 500 firms
by Roger Schmenner and the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. tabulations
indicate that approximately one percent of the manufacturing establishments are
closed each year.6 in 1982, that meant 424 Closures of manufacturing
facilities putting 146,900 employees out of work.

Why collective bargaining as a tool to alleviate the problem of plant
closure and dislocated workers? First, a significant proportion of closures
takes place in unionized facilities. Whereas 52 percent of the facilities
surveyed by Schmenner were unionized, 66 percent of the closings involved
unionized facilities.7 Second, the reasons cited for closure in surveys and
in court cases tend to be amenable to resolution through collective
bargaining. Schmenner 1 s survey revealed that 21 percent of the respondents
cited high labor rates, 17 percent listed price competition due to lower cost
labor, and 10 percent indicated crippling union work rules. (Multiple
responses were permitted.) Reasons cited in court cases have included low
productivity, high wages, and inflexible work rules. Thus, the reasons cited
for closing frequently are topics that have been and could be handled through
the collective bargaining process.
Reich has argued that desired social goals could be achieved more
efficiently through bargaining rather than regulation.8 Collective
bargaining can address the specific problems of the plant and may be able to
tailor a solution that meets the needs of all parties. Legislation cannot
possibly accommodate all of the varied circumstances in which closure is being
considered. Sometimes, the best solution for all will be the end of
production. In other circumstances, changes in wages, operating procedures and
the division of responsibilities would result in profitable operations and
continued employment. (A 1983 study documented one situation in which a 25
percent cut in wages and changes in work rules were necessary to make the
employee owned company competitive).9 Furthermore, if collective bargaining
could lead to profitable operations and continued employment, some older
workers would not be faced with the prospect of seeking new employment while
possessing outdated skills, nor would the economic impact on the community be
as severe.
The reasons listed above suggest that not only may the plant closure
problem be amenable to mitigation through collective bargaining, but using
collective bargaining may be more consistent with institutional and political
considerations than direct regulation.
However, the problem in the private sector is that judicial interpretations
of the National Labor Relations Act have not found the decision to close to be
a mandatory topic of bargaining. Therfore, firms could unilaterally close a
plant. Furthermore, unions either showed no interest or were not able to
obtain plant closure protections into the collectively bargained contract. In
1974, only 14 percent of the major contracts covering manufacturing firms had
advance notice provisions. Little changed by 1980 when 15 percent of the
contracts contained advance notice provisions. (See Table 1).
Therefore, it is necessary to afford workers the opportunity to negotiate
over the decision to close a plant and this would require amending the National
Labor Relations Act's definition of mandatory topics of bargaining under "terms
and other conditions of employment" to include bargaining over the decision to
close. There are positive and negative aspects of this approach. The most
obvious negative aspect is that the NLRA covers only those plants and
workplaces where employees have elected a bargaining agent. A positive feature
is that coverage is uniform throughout the United States, thereby not entering
this issue into competition among the states.

TABLE 1
Percent of Contracts Containing Plant Closure Protections

PROVISION

Supplemental Unemployment Benefits
Severance Pay
Relocation Assistance
Transfer to New Plant
Hiring Rights at New Plant
Advance Notice of Closure
Advance Notice of Technological Change
Number of Contracts

1974
Percent

1980
Percent

22
39
8
15
5
14
10

26
38
11
19
7
15
11

631

676

Source:Computer runs by Wayne Wendling from Characteristics of Major
Collective Bargaining Agreements.
The basic premise is that management and labor will want to obtain a
bargain that leads to profitable operations and is the best alternative in the
labor market. If the bargain necessary to maintain profitable operations
requires wage cuts or changes in work rules greater than necessary as dictated
by market alternatives, no agreement will or should be reached. If operations
more profitable than the alternative can be achieved, management will and
should-stay at the existing plant. If no agreement is possible within the
parameters, it would be inefficient for management and labor to continue at
that location.
Neither management nor labor have perfect foresight. Formal negotiations
every two or three years cannot accommodate all contingencies. Equity
considerations suggest that workers be afforded the opportunity to minimize
eaarnings and/or job loss. Recognizing that doing so also imposes costs on
employers, it is necessary that bargaining over closure be flexible and
expedited.
IV.

COMMENTS ON H.R. 6080

I must preface my comments on H.R. 6080 with the statement that I am not a
student of either the United States Civil Service or collective bargaining by
federal employees. Therefore, I have only limited knowledge of the frequency
and scope of bargained contracts by federal employees. My comments will be
based on the assumption that certain lessons learned from the private sector
are transferable.
Reductions-in-Force (RIFs) are likely to impact federal employees in the
same way a plant closure affects its victims. The most observable impact is
the earnings loss, which has several components. First, there is the direct
and immediate earnings loss due to job separation. Second, initial
reemployment earnings may be less because available employment opportunities
simply do not pay as much as the previous position. Third, total earnings over

the entire career span may be less because the career has been disrupted.
Other effects of plant closure such as a decline in health status, marital
instability also seem to be transferable to RIFs.
The federal government must be prepared to respond to changes in the needs
and priorities of its citizens. The role of one agency may be diminished
whereas another's may be increased. Although the skills and training of
employees may not be directly transferable across agencies, the private and
social costs of unemployment suggest that alternate avenues should be
investigated to insure that unemployment is the option of last resort.
As indicated in my discussion of the private sector, the reasons for
closing a plant frequently are issues that have been or could be resolved
through collective bargaining. RIFs could be viewed as one solution to a
taxpayers are not willing to support the service an agency provides
problem
improving
at the particular cost -- which might have another solution
productivity and reducing the relative cost of providing the service. Both
productivity enhancements and cost reductions are suitable topics of collective
bargaining. Furthermore, recent experiences with labor-management cooperation
initiatives have shown instances of significant cost savings and productivity
improvements when workers and managers are pulling in the same direction JO
Protections are built in the collective bargaining approach. If managers
attempt to extract excessive concessions, the employees will leave because more
favorable alternatives are available in the market, and the most valued
employees are likely to be the first to leave. Furthermore, the information
that managers must supply should insure realistic parameters being
established. If a solution cannot be achieved within the parameters of the
market, that should be the signal that the service cannot be afforded. At that
point our attention should turn to mitigating the impact on the employee.
As we look back at the key elements of the exemplary private sector
initiatives, several points stand out.
* The employer was involved in helping the employee find new employment.
* There were opportunities for retraining.
H.R. 6080 has attempted to incorporate these points from exemplary private
sector program, but with a twist. The federal government is a very significant
employer in a number of labor markets, and the largest in some. H.R. 6080
proposes that the federal government help employees who might be RIFd find
alternate employment in the federal service. In the private sector, firms may
differ in wage schedules, employment practices and hiring procedures, but none
of these potential stumbling blocks exist in the federal government. Thus,
there should be even greater probability of success in placing RIFd employees
within the federal service.
H.R. 6080 also incorporates a retraining provision similar to those in
exemplary programs. This provision goes hand-in-hand with the one described
above. The skills of those losing their jobs will not always match those
needed in the available opportunities. The period of retraining is reasonable
and similar to the period provided in other training programs.
-- 180 days
Recall that there also is a period of training associated with new hires.
However, periods of retraining longer than 180 days may be counterproductive
because they could impair the cost-effective delivery of service by the agency.

V.

CONCLUSIONS

The plant closure problem in the private sector is not resolved.
Insufficient effort has been directed to finding workable solutions to keeping
plants open. Collective bargaining over the decision to close is an avenue
that should be considered more seriously. But when closure is the only
reasonable alternative, some private sector firms have established exemplary
programs to assist those displaced workers' transition to reemployment.
However, the fundamental thrusts of H.R. 6080 are consistent with proposals
and best practices in the private sector. First, the attempt to find an
alternative to RIFs would rely heavily on negotiations and bargaining in the
federal service. Second, the reemployment of RIFd federal employees would be
aided by establishing a government wide placement system. Third, if the skills
match is problematic, retraining for specific positions would be an option.
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September 8, 1984

Mr. John Fitzgerald, Counsel
Subcommittee on Human Resources
Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
U.S. House of Representatives
House Annex I, Room 511
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Fitzgerald:
Enclosed is the written testimony that will serve as the basis of my oral
presentation before the Subcommittee on Human Resources on September 13, 1984
If you have any questions concerning points in the testimony, please do not
hesitate to contact me.
Thank you for the opportunity to report on exemplary practices from the
private sector and comment on H.R. 6080.
Sincerely,

Wayne R. Wendling
Senior Economist
/c
Enclosure
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